Created by potrace 1.10, written by Peter Selinger 2001-2011
Bond

Security

Security Policy

This page mirrors the disclosure policy referenced by the on-chain security.txt embedded in the Smart Bond VishnuSolana program. If you believe you've found a vulnerability in the program or this web app, please report it responsibly using the process below.

This page and /.well-known/security.txt (RFC 9116) read the same fields live from the program's on-chain Program Metadata for the currently selected cluster — no hand-copied duplicates.

On-Chain Program

Verify you're interacting with the genuine Smart Bond Vishnu program on mainnet before approving any transaction.

Program ID (mainnet)
826vc5Kc..YGJpD2hs
Loading on-chain security metadata for mainnet…

Scope

In scope

  • The Smart Bond Vishnu on-chain program (create, sell, buy, check, convert, repay, cancel instructions)
  • PDA derivation and account validation logic
  • The privileged admin instructions (see Trust Assumptions below)
  • Transaction construction in this web app (convertible.capital)

Out of scope

  • Third-party wallets, browser extensions, and RPC providers
  • Social engineering or phishing against users or staff
  • Devnet/testnet-only issues with no mainnet impact
  • Findings that require an already-compromised signer key

Trust Assumptions & Privileged Roles

Smart Bond Vishnu is not fully permissionless. Please report any way these roles could be abused beyond what's documented here.

  • Program upgrade authority— currently a single keypair, not a multisig or timelock. Whoever holds it can replace the program's logic entirely.
  • Admin (admin_config.admin) — initially the upgrade authority, can rotate itself, set the protocol fee (capped at 10%), force any bond convertible early via admin_force_convertible, and sweep abandoned bonds via admin_sweep_unclaimedafter the public sweep deadline. That sweep always forwards collateral to the bond's current owner — the admin only reclaims rent, never user funds.